Philosophy 230
Some Answers to Study Questions:  Rachels, Chpts. 9 and 10 (Kant's Moral Theory)


1.  Imperatives are statemens of the form, "you ought to x," where 'x' is some course of action.
    Hypothetical imperatives are statements about what you ought to do that are dependent
    on some particular end that you happen to have.  For example, it may be true that "you ought
    to study for the final exam in this class," but that imperative depends on a variety of ends that
    you happen to have (to pass the class, to finish your degree, etc.).  That imperative would not
    apply to students not enrolled in this class, because they do not have the ends on which the
    imperative depends.  This means that hypothetical imperatives are always escapable--you
    can always escape the imperative by simply giving up the end on which it is based.

    In contrast, categorical imperatives are imperatives that are not hypothetical.  They apply
    to you independently of any particular ends that you happen to have--they apply to
    you regardless of what it is that you happen to want.  Thus they are not escapable in the
    way that hypothetical imperatives are.  Kant argues that moral imperatives are categorical,
    not hypothetical.  If it is true that you ought (morally) not to commit murder, then this applies
    to you regardless of what you happen to want.  It does not depend, for example, on your
    desire to avoid jail or anything else.  Even if you had no ends that would be promoted by
    not committing murder, the fact would remain:  You ought not do it.   So moral imperatives
    are categorical imperatives.

2.  The ultimate moral imperatives (the Categorical Imperative) is this:  "Act only according to that maxim
    by which you can at the same time will that it should become universal law" (121).  For example,
    Suppose that you are thinking about making a lying promise in order to get money from someone
    to pay the rent.  Your maxim will be, roughly, "I will make a lying promise to get money when I
    need it."  If we transform this into a universal law, it becomes, "Everyone will make a lying promise
    to get money when he or she needs it."  Can we will this universal law to exist?  Kant thinks we
    cannot--in fact he thinks we cannot even conceive it existing.  This is because a world in which
    everyone routinely makes lying promises is a world in which no one pays any attention to promises.
    But that is really a world, then, where there is no such thing as promises--and so actually no
    one is making lying promises either.  Such a universal law is incoherent, and so the Categorical
    Imperative commands us not to make this lying promise.

3.  One problem that Rachels raises is the possibility of situations in which a person has two or
    more absolute moral obligations that conflict with each other--so that no matter what he does
    he is violating an obligation.  For example, suppose a person has an obligation not to lie, but also
    has an obligation not to help someone commit murder.  But suppose then the person finds
    himself in a situation in which he must either lie or help someon commit murder.  If both of these
    obligations are absolute, then the person does something morally wrong no matter what he
    does.

    A defender of Kant might argue that one of these obligations is not really absolute.  For example,
    even though Kant himself thought all lies were morally wrong, it is not clear that his theory
    condemns lies told in order to prevent a murder.  I could will, as universal law, the rule that
    everyone will tell such lies. (Couldn't I?) So if the obligation not to lie were not absolute, we would
    avoid any conflict of duties in the situation mentioned.

4.  Kant develops a second verion of the Categorical Imperative--call the Formula of Humanity as
    an End in Itself.  It commands us to "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person
    or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only" (131).  To illustrate this,
    we could again take up the case of making a lying promise in order to get rent money.  If
    I make this promise, how am I treating the person to whom I make it?  It seems clear that
    I am treating her simply as a means to paying my rent; I am manipulating her for my
    own purposes.  In fact, for Kant, when I lie to her I am treating merely as a means exactly
    that part of her that deserves unconditional respect--her rational agency.  I use the lie to
    manipulate her reason so that she will "voluntarily" give me her money, saving me the
    extra trouble, say, of taking it by force.  I am just using her rational abilities for my
    own purposes, and this is what the Formula of Human commands us never to do.