Selections from Nicolo Machiavelli's  The Prince

CHAPTER I - Kinds of Kingdoms - How They Come ABout


            All states, all political systems, that have held and hold
power over men are either republics or monarchies.

            Monarchies are either hereditary, in which the family has been
long established; or they are new.

            The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco
Sforza, or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary
state of the monarchical ruler who has acquired them, as was the
kingdom of Naples to that of the King of Spain.

            Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live
under a monarchical ruler, or to live in freedom; and are acquired
either by the arms of the monarchical ruler himself, or of others,
or else by fortune or by ability.

CHAPTER II  CONCERNING HEREDITARY MONARCHIES

            I will leave out all discussion on republics, since in another
book I have written of them at length, and will address myself only
to monarchical governments or states.  In doing so I will keep to
the order indicated above, and discuss how such monarchical
governments or states are to be ruled and preserved.

            I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding
hereditary states, and those long accustomed to the family of their
monarchical ruler, than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to
transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with
circumstances as they arise, for a monarchical ruler of average
powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of
it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be
so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the
usurper, he will regain it.

            We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could
not have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in 1484, nor those
of Pope Julius in 1510, unless he had been long established in his
dominions.  For the hereditary monarchical ruler has less cause and
less necessity to offend; hence it happens that he will be more
loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is
reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well
disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule
the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one
change always leaves the teething for another.

CHAPTER III  CONCERNING MIXED MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS OR STATES

            But difficulties occur in a new monarchical state.  And
firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of
a state which, taken collectively, may be called composite, the
changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in
all new monarchical governments or states; for men change their
rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope
induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they
are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have
gone from bad to worse.  This follows also on another natural and
common necessity, which always causes a new monarchical ruler to
burden those who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with
infinite other hardships which he must put upon his new ac-
quisition.

            In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have
injured in seizing that monarchical state, and you are not able to
keep those friends who put you there because of your not being able
to satisfy them in the way they expected, and you cannot take
strong measures against them, feeling bound to them.  For, although
one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province
one has always need of the goodwill of the natives.

            For these reasons Louis XII, King of France, quickly occupied
Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time
it only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened
the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of
future benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new
monarchical ruler.  It is very true that, after acquiring
rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost
afterwards, because the monarchical ruler, with little reluctance,
takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents,
to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest
places.  Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was
enough for the Duke Lodovico to raise insurrections on the borders;
but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring
the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated
and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above
mentioned.

            Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and
the second time.  The general reasons for the first have been
discussed; it remains to name those for the second, and to see what
resources he had, and what any one in his situation would have had
for maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did
the King of France.

            Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added
to an ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the
same country and language, or they are not.  When they are, it is
easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed
to self-government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have
destroyed the family of the monarchical ruler who was ruling them;
because the two peoples, preserving in other things the old con-
ditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly
together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and
Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,
although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the
customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on
amongst themselves.  He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold
them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that
the family of their former lord is extinguished; the other, that
neither their laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very
short time they will become entirely one body with the old monarc-
hical state.

            But when states are acquired in a country differing in
language, customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good
fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the
greatest and most real helps would be that he who has acquired them
should go and reside there.  This would make his position more
secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece, who,
notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding
that state. [See Note below]  If he had not settled there, he would

==================================
Note: Referring to the conquest of Constantinople and the last
remnants of the Byzantine Empire by the Ottoman Turks in 1453 who
then made Constantinople their new capital, renaming it Istanbul.
==================================

not have been able to keep it.  Because, if one is on the spot,
disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy
them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they
are great, and then one can no longer remedy them.  Besides this,
the country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are
satisfied by prompt recourse to the monarchical ruler; thus,
wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing
to be otherwise, to fear him.  He who would attack that state from
the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the
monarchical ruler resides there it can only be wrested from him
with the greatest difficulty.

            The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two
places, which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary
either to do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry
and infantry.  A monarchical ruler does not spend much on colonies,
for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them
there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he
takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and
those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able
to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept
quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it
should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. 
In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are
more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said,
being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark
that men ought either to be well treated or else utterly crushed,
because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more
serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done
to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear
of revenge.

            But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one
spends much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income
from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many
more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through
the shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with
hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst
beaten on their own ground are yet able to do hurt.  For every
reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is
useful.

            Again, the monarchical ruler who holds a country differing in
the above respects ought to make himself the head and defender of
his less powerful neighbors, and to weaken the more powerful
amongst them, taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himself
shall, by any accident, get a footing there; for it will always
happen that such a one will be introduced by those who are
discontented, either through excess of ambition or through fear, as
one has seen already.  The Romans were brought into Greece by the
Aetolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing
they were brought in by the inhabitants.  And the usual course of
affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country,
all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which
they feel against the ruling power.  So that in respect to these
subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to
himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he
has acquired there.  He has only to take care that they do not get
hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his
own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the
more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the
country.  And he who does not properly manage this business will
soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will
have endless difficulties and troubles.

            The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed
closely these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly
relations with the minor powers, without increasing their strength;
they kept down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign
powers to gain authority.  Greece appears to me sufficient for an
example.  The Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them,
the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet
the merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them
permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of
Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends without first
humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agree
that he should retain any lordship over the country.  Because the
Romans did in these instances what all prudent monarchical rulers
ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also
future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy,
because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait
until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the
malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the
physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of
the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the
course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the
beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure.  Thus
it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have
been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they
can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been
foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one
can see them, there is no longer a remedy.  Therefore, the Romans,
foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a
war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is
not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others;
moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece
so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided both,
but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which is
for ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:---Let us enjoy
the benefits of the time---but rather the benefits of their own
valor and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is
able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as
good. . .

CHAPTER XV  THING FOR WHICH MEN AND ESPECIALLY MONARCHS, ARE
PRAISED OR BLAMED

            It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct
for a monarchical ruler towards subjects and friends.  And as I
know that many have written on this point, I expect I shall be con-
sidered presumptuous in mentioning it again, especially as in
discussing it I shall depart from the methods of other people. 
But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful
to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to
follow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it;
for many have  pictured republics and monarchical governments or
states which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one
lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who
neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his
ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up
to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him
among so much that is evil.

            Hence it is necessary for a monarchical ruler wishing to hold
his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not
according to necessity.  Therefore, putting on one side imaginary
things concerning a monarchical ruler, and discussing those which
are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of, and chiefly
monarchical rulers for being more highly placed, are remarkable for
some of those qualities which bring them either blame or praise;
and thus it is that one is reputed a generous spender, another
tight-fisted, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in
our language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst
we call one tight-fisted who deprives himself too much of the use
of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one
compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and
cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one
lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard,
another easy; one grave, another frivolous; one religious, another
unbelieving, and the like.  And I know that every one will confess
that it would be most praiseworthy in a monarchical ruler to
exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but
because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for
human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be
sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of
those vices which would lose him his state; and also to keep
himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it;
but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon
himself to them.  And again, he need not make himself uneasy at in-
curring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only
be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered
carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue,
if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks
like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.

CHAPTER XVI  LAVISH SPENDING VS. ECONOMIC RESTRAINT 

            Commencing then with the first of the above-named
characteristics, I say that it would be well to be reputed a
generous spender.  Nevertheless, spending lavishly exercised in a
way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures you; for
if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it may
not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its
opposite.  Therefore, any one wishing to maintain a reputation
among men for generosity, is obliged to avoid no attribute of
magnificence; so that a monarchical ruler thus inclined will
consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled in the
end, if he wish to maintain this reputation, to unduly weigh down
his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. 
This will soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor
will be little valued by any one; thus, with his lavish spending,
having offended many and rewarded few, he is affected by the very
first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the first danger;
recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs
at once into the reproach of being miserly.

            Therefore, a monarchical ruler, not being able to exercise
this virtue of generosity in such a way that it is recognized,
except to his cost, if he is wise he ought not to fear the
reputation of being a penny-pincher, for in time he will come to be
more highly esteemed than if thought to be a spendthrift, seeing
that with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend
himself against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises
without burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he
exercises generosity towards all from whom he does not take, who
are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does not
give, who are few.

            We have not seen great things done in our time except by those
who have been considered economical; the rest have failed.  Pope
Julius the Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a
reputation for spending freely, yet he did not strive afterwards to
keep it up, when he made war on the King of France; and he made
many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on his subjects,
for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long
thriftiness.  The present King of Spain would not have undertaken
or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed to be
generous.  A monarchical ruler, therefore, provided that he has not
to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not
become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious,
ought to hold of little account a reputation for being stingy, for
it is one of those vices which will enable him to govern.

            And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by loosening
his purse-strings, and many others have reached the highest
positions by having been free with their money, and by being
considered so, I answer: Either you are a monarchical ruler in
fact, or on your way to becoming one.  In the first case this
lavish spending is dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to
be considered generous; and Caesar was one of those who wished to
become preeminent in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming
so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his
government.  And if any one should reply: Many have been
monarchical rulers, and have done great things with armies, who
have been considered very generous, I reply: Either a monarchical
ruler spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else that of
others.  In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he
ought not to neglect any opportunity for spending freely.  And to
the monarchical ruler who goes forth with his army, supporting it
by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to
others, this lavish spending is necessary, otherwise he would not
be followed by soldiers.  And of that which is neither yours nor
your subjects' you can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and
Alexander; because it does not take away your reputation if you
squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only squandering
your own money that injures you.

            And there is nothing that depreciates in value so rapidly as
a reputation for generosity, for even whilst you exercise it you
lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or despised, or
else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated.  And a monarchical
ruler should guard himself, above all things, against being
despised and hated; and spending too much leads you to both. 
Therefore it is wiser to have a reputation for meanness which
brings reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through
seeking a reputation for generous spending to incur a name for
rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.

CHAPTER XVII  CONCERNING CRUELTY AND MERCY, AND WHETHER IT IS
BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED 

            Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that
every monarchical ruler ought to desire to be considered merciful
and not cruel.  Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse
this mercy.  Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding,
his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to
peace and loyalty.  And if this be rightly considered, he will be
seen to have been much more merciful than the Florentine people,
who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistola to be
destroyed.  Therefore a monarchical ruler, so long as he keeps his
subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of
cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than
those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from
which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the
whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a
monarchical ruler offend the individual only.

            And of all monarchical rulers, it is impossible for the new
monarchical ruler to avoid the imputation of cruelty, owing to new
states being full of dangers.  Hence Virgil, through the mouth of
Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign owing to its being new,
saying:

     "... against my will, my fate,
     A throne unsettled, and an infant state,             
     Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,      
     And guard with these severities my shores."

            Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor
should he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with
prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him
incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable.

            Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved
than feared, or is it better to be feared than loved? It may be
answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is
difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be
feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with. 
Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are
ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you
succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood,
property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is
far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you.  And
that monarchical ruler who, relying entirely on their promises, has
neglected other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that
are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind,
may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need
cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending one
who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the
link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken
at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by
a dread of punishment which never fails.

            Nevertheless a monarchical ruler ought to inspire fear in such
a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he
can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which
will always be as long as he keeps his hands off of the property
and the women of his citizens and subjects.  But when it is
necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must
do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all
things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because
men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of
their father's inheritance.  Besides, pretexts for taking away the
property are never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by
robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to
others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more
difficult to find and sooner lapse.  But when a monarchical ruler
is with his army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers,
then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of
cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army united or
disposed to its duties.

            Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated:
that having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of
men, to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among
them or against the monarchical ruler, regardless of whether things
were going well or poorly with Hannibal.  This arose from nothing
else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valor,
made him revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but
without that cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to
produce this effect.  And shortsighted writers admire his deeds
from one point of view and from another condemn the principal cause
of them.  That it is true his other virtues would not have been
sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most
excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of
man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this
arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his
soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. 
For this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and
called the corrupter of the Roman soldiery.  The Locrians were laid
waste by a legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor
was the insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his
easy nature.  Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to
excuse him, said there were many men who knew much better how not
to err than to correct the errors of others.  This disposition if
he had been continued in the command, would have destroyed in time
the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the control of
the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed
itself, but contributed to his glory.

            Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to
the conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and
fearing according to that of the monarchical ruler, a wise
monarchical ruler should establish himself on that which is in his
own control and not in that of others; he must endeavor only to
avoid hatred, as is noted.

CHAPTER XVIII  WHEN, AND IF, IT IS USEFUL FOR MONARCHS TO KEEP
THEIR PROMISES

            Everyone admits how praiseworthy it is in a monarchical ruler
to keep his word, and to live with integrity and not crookedly. 
Nevertheless our experience has been that those monarchical rulers
who have done great things have held good faith of little account,
and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craftiness
and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. 
You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law,
the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second
to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it
is necessary to have recourse to the second.  Therefore it is
necessary for a monarchical ruler to understand how to avail
himself of the beast and the man.  This has been figuratively
taught to monarchical rulers by ancient writers, who describe how
Achilles and many other monarchical rulers of old were given to the
Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipline;
which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half
beast and half man, so it is necessary for a monarchical ruler to
know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the
other is not durable.  A monarchical ruler, therefore, being
compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and
the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and
the fox cannot defend himself against wolves.  Therefore, it is
necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify
the wolves.  Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand
what they are about.  Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he
to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and
when the reasons no longer exist that caused him to pledge his
word.  If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but
because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are
not bound to observe it with them.  Nor will there ever be wanting
to a monarchical ruler legitimate reasons to excuse this
nonobservance.  Of this endless modern examples could be given,
showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and
of no effect through the faithlessness of monarchical rulers; and
he who has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.

            But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this
characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men
are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who
seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to
be deceived.  One recent example I cannot pass over in silence. 
[Pope] Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever
thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there
never was a man who had greater power in asserting, or who with
greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less;
nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to his wishes,
because he well understood this side of mankind.

            Therefore it is unnecessary for a monarchical ruler to have
all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary
to appear to have them.  And I shall dare to say this also, that to
have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to
appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful,
humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed
that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how
to change to the opposite.

            And you have to understand this, that a monarchical ruler,
especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which men
are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state,
to act contrary to faith, friendship, humanity, and religion. 
Therefore it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn
itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it,
yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can
avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about
it.

            For this reason a monarchical ruler ought to take care that he
never lets anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the
above-named five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and
hears him altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and
religious.  There is nothing more necessary to appear to have than
this last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye
than by the hand, because it belongs to everybody to see you, to
few to come in touch with you.  Every one sees what you appear to
be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose
themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the
state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially
of monarchical rulers, which it is not prudent to challenge, one
judges by results.

            For that reason, let a monarchical ruler have the credit of
conquering and holding his state, the means will always be
considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody; because the
vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what
comes of it; and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the
few find a place there only when the many have no ground to rest
on.

            One monarchical ruler of the present time, whom it is not well
to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and
to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would
have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time.

CHAPTER XIX  EVEN MONARCHS MUST TRY TO REMAIN POPULAR WITH THEIR
SUBJECTS 

            Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made
above, I have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish
to discuss briefly under this generality, that the monarchical
ruler, as has been in part said before, must consider how to avoid
those things which will make him hated or held in contempt; and as
often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part,
and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches.

            It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be
rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his
subjects, from both of which he must abstain.  And when neither
their property nor honor is touched, the majority of men live
content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few,
whom he can curb with ease in many ways.

            He will be held in contempt if he appears to be fickle,
frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which
a monarchical ruler should guard himself as from a rock; and he
should endeavor to show in his actions greatness, courage, dignity,
and of strong-will and resolve; and in his private dealings with
his subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and
maintain himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to
deceive him or to get round him.

            That monarchical ruler is highly esteemed who conveys this
impression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily
conspired against; for, provided it is well known that he is an
excellent man and revered by his people, he can only be attacked
with difficulty.  For this reason a monarchical ruler ought to have
two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other
from without, on account of external powers.  From the latter he is
defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is
well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always
remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they should
have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs
outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and
has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will
resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

            But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are
disturbed he has only to fear that they will conspire secretly,
from which a monarchical ruler can easily secure himself by
avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping the people satis-
fied with him, which it is most necessary for him to accomplish, as
I said above at length.  And one of the most efficacious remedies
that a monarchical ruler can have against conspiracies is not to be
hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a
monarchical ruler always expects to please the people by his
removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to
offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course,
for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite.  And
as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have
been successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can
he take a companion except from those whom he believes to be mal-
contents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent
you have given him the material with which to content himself, for
by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that, seeing
the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be
doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a
thoroughly obstinate enemy of the monarchical ruler, to keep faith
with you.

            And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on
the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy,
and the prospect of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of
the monarchical ruler there is the majesty of the monarchical
state, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to defend
him; so that, adding to all these things the people's goodwill, it
is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire.  For
whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution
of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the
crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and
thus cannot hope for any escape.

            Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be
content with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. 
Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, who was monarchical ruler in Bologna
(grandfather of the present Annibale), having been murdered by the
Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one of his family
survived but Messer Giovanni, who was in childhood: immediately
after his assassination the people rose up and murdered all the
Canneschi.  This sprung from the popular goodwill which the house
of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great
that, although none remained there after the death of Annibale who
were able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having information that
there was one of the Bentivoglio family in Florence, who up to that
time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to Florence
for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was ruled
by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government.

            For this reason I consider that a monarchical ruler ought to
reckon conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in
esteem; but when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards
him, he ought to fear everything and everybody.  And well-ordered
states and wise monarchical rulers have taken every care not to
drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied
and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a
monarchical ruler can have.

            Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is
France, and in it are found many good institutions on which depend
the liberty and security of the king; of these the first is the
parliament and its authority, because he who founded the kingdom,
knowing the ambition of the nobility and their boldness, considered
that a bit in their mouths would be necessary to hold them in; and,
on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people, founded in
fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect them, yet he was not
anxious for this to be the particular care of the king; therefore,
to take away the reproach which he would be liable to from the
nobles for favoring the people, and from the people for favoring
the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat
down the great and favor the lesser without reproach to the king. 
Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or
a greater source of security to the king and kingdom.  From this
one can draw another important conclusion, that monarchical rulers
ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of others, and
keep those of grace in their own hands.  And further, I consider
that a monarchical ruler ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as
to make himself hated by the people.

            It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives
and deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an ex-
ample contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly
and showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost
their empire or have been killed by subjects who have conspired
against them.  Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I
will recall the characters of some of the emperors, and will show
that the causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged
by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration those
things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those
times.

            It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who
succeeded to the empire from Marcus Aurelius down to Maximinus;
they were Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julias Didias,
Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus,
Alexander, and Maximinus.

            There is first to note that, whereas in other monarchical
governments or states the ambition of the nobles and the insolence
of the people only have to be contended with, the Roman emperors
had a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and
greed of their soldiers, a matter so beset with difficulties that
it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give
satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people loved
peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring monarchical
ruler, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike monarchical ruler who
was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite
willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get
double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty.  Hence it
arose that those emperors were always overthrown who, either by
birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them,
especially those who came new to the monarchical state, recognizing
the difficulty of these two opposing humors, were inclined to give
satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the
people.  Which course was necessary, because, as monarchical rulers
cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place,
to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot achieve
this, they ought to endeavor with the utmost diligence to avoid the
hatred of the most powerful.  Therefore, those emperors who through
inexperience had need of special favor adhered more readily to the
soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out advantageous
to them or not, accordingly as the monarchical ruler knew how to
maintain authority over them.

            From these causes it arose that Marcus [Aurelius], Pertinax,
and Alexander, being all men of modest life, lovers of justice,
enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except
Marcus; he alone lived and died honored, because he had succeeded
to the throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the
soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being possessed of many
virtues which made him respected, he always kept both orders in
their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor despised.

            But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the
soldiers, who, being accustomed to live high on the hog under
Commodus, could not endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished
to reduce them; thus, having given cause for hatred, to which
hatred there was added contempt for his old age, he was overthrown
at the very beginning of his administration.  And here it should be
noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones,
therefore, as I said before, a monarchical ruler wishing to keep
his state is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is
corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself---it
may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles---you have
to submit to its humors and to gratify them, and then good works
will do you harm.

            But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great
goodness, that among the other praises which are accorded him is
this, that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever
put to death by him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered
effeminate and a man who allowed himself to be governed by his
mother, he became despised, the army conspired against him, and
murdered him.

            Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus,
Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel
and rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate
to commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all,
except Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much
valor that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were
oppressed by him, he reigned successfully; for his valor made him
so---much admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the
latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former
respectful and satisfied.  And because the actions of this man, as
a new monarchical ruler, were great, I wish to show briefly that he
knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures,
as I said above, it is necessary for a Monarchical ruler to
imitate.

            Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julias Didias, he persuaded
the army in Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be
right to go to Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been
killed by the Praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without
appearing to aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and
reached Italy before it was known that he had started.  On his
arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and
killed Julias.  After this there remained for Severus, who wished
to make himself master of the whole empire, two difficulties; one
in Asia, where Niger, head of the Roman army in the Middle East,
had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west
where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne.  And as he
considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he
decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus.  To the latter he
wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to
share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and,
moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which
things were accepted by Albinus as true.  But after Severus had
conquered and killed Niger, and settled affairs in the Middle East,
he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus,
little recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had
by treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was
compelled to punish him.  Afterwards he sought him out in France,
and took from him his government and life.  He who will, therefore,
carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a most val-
iant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and
respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not
be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so
well, because his supreme renown always protected him from that
hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his
violence.

            But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very
excellent qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the
people and acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man,
most enduring of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other
luxuries, which caused him to be beloved by the armies.  Never-
theless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great and so unheard of
that, after endless single murders, he killed a large number of the
people of Rome and all those of Alexandria.  He became hated by the
whole world, and also feared by those he had around him, to such an
extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a
centurion.  And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which
are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage,
cannot be avoided by monarchical rulers, because any one who does
not fear to die can inflict them; but a monarchical ruler may fear
them the less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful
not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around
him in the service of the state.  Antoninus had not taken this
care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion,
whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard;
which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the em-
peror's ruin.

            But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very
easy to hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had
inherited it, and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his
father to please his people and soldiers; but, being by nature
cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to amusing the soldiers and
corrupting them, so that he might indulge his rapacity upon the
people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, often
descending to the theater to compete with gladiators, and doing
other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell
into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and
despised by the other, he was conspired against and killed.

            It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus.  He was a
very warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the
effeminacy of Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him
and elected Maximinus to the throne.  This he did not possess for
long, for two things made him hated and despised; the one, his
having been a shepherd in his youth in Thrace, which brought him
into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great
indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession
to his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of
the imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost
ferocity by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in
the empire, practiced many cruelties, so that the whole world was
moved to anger at his low-class origins and to fear at his
barbarity.  First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all the
people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may
be added his own army: this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting
with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties,
and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered
him.

            I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julias,
who, being thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I
will bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that
monarchical rulers in our times have this difficulty of giving
inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far less degree,
because, notwithstanding one has to give them some indulgence, that
is soon done; none of these monarchical rulers have armies that are
veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were
the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more
necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people,
it is now more necessary to all monarchical rulers, except the
Turkish Sultan, to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers,
because the people are the more powerful.

            From the above I have excepted the Turkish Sultan, who always
keeps round him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand
cavalry on which depend the security and strength of the kingdom,
and it is necessary that, putting aside every consideration for the
people, he should keep them his friends.  The kingdom of the Sultan
is similar; being entirely in the hands of soldiers, it follows
again that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his
friends.  But you must note that the state of the Sultan is unlike
all other monarchical governments or states, for the reason that it
is more like the Christian Papacy, which cannot be called either an
hereditary or a newly formed monarchical state; because the sons of
the old monarchical ruler are not the heirs, but only whoever is
elected to that position by those who have authority, and the sons
remain only noblemen.  And this being an ancient custom it cannot
be called a new monarchical state, because there are none of those
difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the
monarchical ruler is new, the constitution of the state is old, and
it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary
lord.

            But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that
whoever will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or
contempt has been fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be
recognized also how it happened that, a number of them acting in
one way and a number in another, only one in each way came to a
happy end and the rest to unhappy ones.  Because it would have been
useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, being new
monarchical rulers, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the
monarchical state; and likewise it would have been utterly de-
structive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated
Severus, they not having sufficient valor to enable them to tread
in his footsteps.  Therefore a monarchical ruler, new to the
monarchical state, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor,
again, is it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he ought to
take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his
state, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep
a state that may already be stable and firm.


CHAPTER XXII  CONCERNING THE STAFFERS OF  MONARCHS

            The choice of aides is of no little importance to a
monarchical ruler, and they are good or not according to the
discrimination of the monarchical ruler.  And the first opinion
which one forms of a monarchical ruler, and of his understanding,
is by observing the staff he has around him; and when they are
capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, because he
has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. 
But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him,
for the prime error which he made was in choosing them.

            Whoever knew Messer Antonio da Venafro, the servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci, Monarchical ruler of Siena, believed that Pan-
dolfo had proved himself to be a very clever man in having
appointed Venafro as his aide.  Because there are three classes of
intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another which
appreciates what others comprehend; and a third which neither
comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is
the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. 
Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the
first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to
know good or bad when it is said and done, although he himself may
not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad
in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct;
thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.

            But to enable a monarchical ruler to form an opinion of his
servant there is one test which never falls; when you see the
servant thinking more of his own interests than of yours, and
seeking only his own profit in everything, such a man will never
make a good asset, nor will you ever be able to trust him; because
he who has the state of another in his hands ought never to think
of himself, but always of his monarchical ruler, and never pay any
attention to matters in which the monarchical ruler is not
concerned.

            On the other hand, to keep his aides and staff honest the
monarchical ruler ought to study him, honoring him, enriching him,
doing him kindnesses, sharing with him the honors and cares; and at
the same time let him see that he cannot stand alone, so that many
honors may not make him desire more, many riches make him wish for
more, and that many cares may make him dread changes.  When a
monarchical ruler and his staff behave toward each other in this
manner they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end
will always be disastrous for either one or the other.

CHAPTER XXIII  HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

            I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this
subject, for it is a danger from which monarchical rulers are with
difficulty preserved, unless they are very careful and
discriminating.  It is that of flatterers, of whom courts are full,
because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a
way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty
from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the
danger of falling into contempt.  Because there is no other way of
guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that
to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may
tell you the truth, respect for you abates.

            Therefore a wise monarchical ruler ought to hold a third
course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to them
only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of
those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought
to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and
afterwards form his own conclusions.  With these councilors, sep-
arately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way
that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak,
the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen
to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his
resolutions.  He who does otherwise is either overthrown by
flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he
falls into contempt.

            I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example.  Fra Luca,
the man of affairs to Maximilian I, the present emperor, speaking
of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his
own way in anything.  This arose because of his following a
practice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive
man - he does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he
receive opinions on them.  But as in carrying them into effect they
become revealed and known, they are at once obstructed by those men
whom he has around him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from
them.  Hence it follows that those things he does one day he undoes
the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to
do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.

            A monarchical ruler, therefore, ought always to take counsel,
but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather
to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it;
but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a
patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also,
on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him
the truth, he should let his anger be felt.

            And if there are some who think that a monarchical ruler who
conveys an impression of his wisdom is not so through his own
ability, but through the good advisers that he has around him,
beyond doubt they are deceived, because this is an axiom which
never fails: that a monarchical ruler who is not wise himself will
never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs
entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man.  In
this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for
long, because such a governor would in a short time take away his
state from him.

            But if a monarchical ruler who is not experienced should take
counsel from more than one he will never get united counsels, nor
will he know how to unite them.  Each of the counsellors will think
of his own interests, and the monarchical ruler will not know how
to control them or to see through them.  And they are not to be
found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you unless
they are kept honest by constraint.  Therefore it must be inferred
that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom
of the monarchical ruler, and not the wisdom of the monarchical
ruler from good counsels.