Section 26:
Theories About the Causes of
Political Revolutions

One of the most controversial topics in Political Science is the study of revolutions. While many students of politics have been content to describe, or define and study the characteristics and processes of revolutions others, such as Karl Marx and his followers, have embraced revolution as a means of re-making nations into their own image of an ideal society. One of the earliest known usages of the term "revolution" in a more modern political context occurred following the July 14, 1789 storming of the Bastille, the fortress-prison in downtown Paris that symbolized royal power in France:

	King Louis XVI:	It's a revolt!
	Courtier:  	No, Sire, it is a revolution. 


In the early twentieth century many Western intellectuals had come to accept some variant of Marx's economic explanation of revolutions, namely that revolutions are initiated by revolts of lower-class workers and peasants in response to unbearable economic oppression. This view was challenged in 1936, when talk of "revolution" was thick in the midst of the Great Depression, by Crane Brinton's Anatomy of Revolution. What follows is a summary and review of this Political Science "Classic" . . .

In an effort to find universal regularities and causes of revolutions, Crane Brinton studied four major revolutions: the English Revolution of 1641, the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789, and the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Brinton attempted to apply the scientific method to analyzing these revolutions but in studying these he insists one can only use a clinical, or "case study" approach, not an experimental or statistical approach. He characterized stable political systems as systems which are in equilibrium and revolutions as crises in which the political system has lost internal equilibrium and attempts to re-establish equilibrium by creating a new political and social order. Crane considered the main ideological issues of the English, Russian and French revolutions to have been focused on creating a new social-economic order whereas he considered the American revolution more nationalist-territorial in nature.

I. Analysis of Conditions of "Old Regimes"

Pre-revolutionary governments tend to be in financial difficulties. They have high deficits, insufficient tax revenues to cover expenses, and dwindling credit but the societies themselves tend to be in a prosperous period. Even backward Russia was in an economic "boom phase" in 1906-1912.

In spite of the relative prosperity many middle and other well-to-do people feel economically threatened by the actions of the government---they feel themselves wronged or constrained unduly by impositions on economic activity by the government or by its taxation. Rather than the old regime being overbearing and tyrannical Brinton finds that the older regime is really just inept and unable to respond effectively to the wants, needs and desires of these "wronged" classes.

A phenomenon referred to as the "Alienation of the Intellectuals" occurs as well. Writers and other leaders of opinion transfer their allegiance from the existing "discredited, morally bankrupt" social and political order to other ideals. Brinton holds that bad social and economic conditions alone do not make revolutions...there must also be revolutionary ideas. "No ideas, no revolution," he quips (p. 49).

Class Warfare: Brinton does not find that the proletariat [Marx's term for the industrial working classes] play an essential, pivotal role in these revolutions. Rather it is the middle to upper-middle classes who are fueled by hatred of the system. This hatred stems from a stoppage of the circulation of the elites, that is, a cut-off in social mobility of the talented and ambitious people due to the inability of the system to provide them with opportunities for self-advancement. Usually the ruling class is itself divided against itself and unable to react decisively in face of these demands, e.g. even the conservative Edmund Burke sided with the American colonists against the British government, while the Russian nobleman, Leo Tolstoy, sympathized with the Russian revolutionists rather than with the Tsar.

II. First Stages of Revolution (relatively bloodless)



III. Who are the Revolutionists?

Brinton's study rejected the cliché of revolutionaries as being wild-eyed, blood-thirsty fanatics hell-bent on destruction to achieve utopia. He found that revolutionaries in each case comprised members of all classes, and were basically people of ordinary intelligence and not psychologically abnormal. He did find that the leaders of the revolution proved to be much more effective in administration than those whom they had overthrown and much more clever at manipulation of public opinion than are leaders in non-revolutionary situations.

IV. Rule of the "Moderates"

One group of the revolutionists takes control of the government administration and tries to behave as realists and sensible politicians should behave in a non-revolutionary situation. Their mistake is that they overlook the fact that as long the revolutionary genie is still out of the bottle, the mass of revolutionary followers, who are fed up with "business-as-usual," will continue to make more demands and will not accept a return to ordinary politics. The problem is that the revolution itself unleashes a blind hated in its followers that makes them willing to sacrifice themselves, their enemies and their children to achieve their revolutionary ideal---they are in no mood to deal with compromise and 'politicking as usual' which is all that the moderates are able or willing to offer.

	Classic quote:  

	"The moderates by definition are not great haters, 
	are not endowed with the effective blindness which 
	keeps men like Robespierre and Leninundistracted 
	in their rise to power." (p. 146)

The initial revolutionary government is characterized by what Brinton calls "dual sovereignty"--joint rule by moderates, who are under the illusion that older norms of legitimacy and authority are still applicable to politics in the new order, and the extremists who view the revolution as having barely begun. In America the moderates were the Loyalists who disapproved of the Declaration of Independence and who afterwards moved to Canada or returned to England.

V. Ascension of the Extremists

While the moderates try to "muddle-through" using the clunky and ineffective administrative apparatus inherited from the old regime, the extremists proceed to create their own parallel government staffed only by their own loyal followers and encumbered only by their own sense of revolutionary justice and legality. The extremists turn out to be few in number, well-organized, completely indifferent to the feelings and opinions of others, including the sentiments of the majority, and quite willing to achieve their goals at the cost of extreme human suffering, whether to themselves or to others.

These tend not to be idealists or theorists but rather practical people with administrative talent and energy and much political experience. It is because they are relatively unreflective, not given to theorizing or introspective self-criticism unlike their opponents, the moderates, that they are able to violate existing norms and to kill their fellow citizens without qualms, remorse or guilt. Mao Zedong once said, "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun," but even non-Maoist and non-Marxist revolutionary extremists believe this.

When the opportunity is right the extremists overthrow the moderates in a coup d'état. The moment these extremists seize power they are transformed into arch-conservatives [of the new order] and will execute former allies at the bat of an eyelid if these dare to criticize them. In a revolutionary situation normal norms of civil discourse in an open society no longer prevail. Any criticism of the extremist government, no matter how constructive or how well intended, will be construed as treasonous counter-revolution. The extremists abandon pretenses of democracy and rule instead through a system of committees and ad hoc vigilante law. This is really a transitional regime, known as a "Reign of Terror," which lasts only as long as the transition to a new political equilibrium. All regimes of terror share one commonality: ordinary criminal activity, such as murder, muggings, theft, rape, white-collar crime, and the like, virtually disappear.

Note: Some scholars of Idaho history assert that Idaho itself had a "reign of terror" in the 1800s prior to gaining statehood, when vigilante activity filled the vacuum of regular courts and law enforcement authorities.

VI. The Reign of Virtue and Terror

In his book, Interpreting the French Revolution, François Furet claims that during the period of the Terror the ordinary distinction between "civil society" and the "political system" collapsed---all private actions, thoughts, words were viewed as inherently political. Hence everything, even the name you gave your child, was either "politically correct" or was "counter-revolutionary," (in other words, "punishable by death").

Revolutionary regimes tend to be extremely puritanical and seek to root out prostitution, pornography, drunkenness, drug addiction, and gambling as well as more innocent forms of entertainment. "Privacy" and the desire to be left alone are simply viewed as being "counter-revolutionary." The mob mentality that prevails thinks, "Why would anyone want privacy,---except to plot against the revolution?" Block committees keep neighborhoods under surveillance and the pro-regime "rent-a-mob" groups administer "spontaneous revolutionary justice" in the form of beatings and lynchings to whomever offends revolutionary norms even while policemen look on passively. Brinton presses an analogy between religious and revolutionary fanaticism: To the revolution's supporters the revolution is the one true religion and all who lack enthusiasm for it are either sinners or damnable heretics.

Elements of period of the Reign of Terror:



VII. "Burn-out" of Thermidorean Reaction [Thermidor, 4 = July, 1793]

Revolutions run by extremists burn themselves out. Extremists have a tendency to kill each other off. After "the revolution devours its own children" the reins of government tend to slip into hands of more opportunistic and less ideological administrators. Citizens tire of the violation of their privacy under a puritanical government and long for the restoration of an independent civil society. A single dictator tends to take over in this period whose main appeal is that he promises to restore and enforce public order. Amnesties of those imprisoned or exiled by the extremists are declared and memories of those executed are often rehabilitated.

Although the Thermidorean period is usually followed by severe economic crisis nobody is in a mood for another revolution. Civil society resumes its independent life. Both religiosity and debauchery make their come-backs. But even after Thermidor ideas and institutions have been irreversibly changed by the revolution.

Other Explanations:

Beginning early in the twentieth century both American and British political scientists had become increasingly enchanted by Marxist, or quasi-Marxist, theories of revolution and social order. Although most would deny that they were socialists, much less Marxists, most intellectuals professed a disdain for capitalism and the older forms of "liberal democratic" thought that had sought to minimize government involvement in economic affairs or the private life of individuals. Needless to say Crane Brinton's book was not well-received because it flew in the face of this then-fashionable "pop Marxism." It is therefore appropriate to review some of Marx's thought on revolution to understand the criticism launched against Brinton's analysis.

Karl Marx: Material causes prevail over "ideological" causes in making revolutions. Revolutions are held to be caused by the development of "contradictions" within a mode of production. The mode of production was made up of the "methods of production" (=actual technology and type of production) and the "relations of production" (= legal forms of economic system, including ownership and management of resources, and formal division of labor between the classes). When the contradiction becomes intolerable this leads to conflict causing a new mode of production to become established.

One of the most strident criticisms and intellectual challenges to Brinton's theory came from James C. Davies. He published a revised version of Marx's materialist thesis in a major article, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, (Feb. 1962) 27: (1): 5-19. Davies attempted to rebut Brinton's ideological explanation by stressing the primacy of material and economic causes. He outlined in this article the "J-Curve" hypothesis and presented some historical evidence to back it up.

  EXPLANATION OF "J-CURVE" HYPOTHESIS

   L N I |           + 			In the graph to the left the
   e a n |          +| 			upward-sloping line ( / ) 
   v t c |         + | <--------(b)	represents the actual growing
   e i o |        + _|_ 		standard of living of the people
   l o m |       + /   \		of a nation.  At any given time
     n w |      + /     \		t-1 there is a gap between the
   o a   |     + /			level of living where people think
   f l   |    + /			they deserve to be ( +++ ) and 
         |   +|/ <----------------(a)	where they are but usually it is 
         |  + /				a tolerable gap, as in (a).  But
         | + / 				if an economic downturn occurs
         |+ / 				and actual living standards fall
         | /				people nonetheless continue to 
         |/				expect their living standards to
         |_____________________________ grow along the +++ line.  Then 
             t-1   t-2			the gap, as at (b), grows so large
           T I M E 			that it becomes intolerable and
					civil unrest grows.  The gap
	between where you really are and where you think you deserve
	to be is what Davies called 'relative deprivation.'  Note
	the upside-down "J" shape of the curve formed by the line
	showing the economic downturn.  Davies hypothesized that 
  	revolutions would break out when the "J-curve" appeared 
	at, or after, the time t-2 of the economic slowdown.				

A Reply on Behalf of Brinton: Ted Gurr, a political scientist and sociologist famous for his own study of political violence, Why Men Rebel, decided to investigate the validity and soundness of Davies' theory in his own article, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review, (4 Dec. 1968), 62: 1104-1124. This article showed Davies failed really to refute Brinton because instead of Davies having proven that worsening economic conditions led to revolution he really had only demonstrated that perceptions of worsening economic conditions were sufficient to account for revolt. Gurr's own study found that even when economic conditions were improving that when perceptions of economic deprivation were joined to perceptions of government illegitimacy that civil strife would follow.

Gurr studied cases of civil strife occurring in 114 political systems and found statistical evidence for the role of perceptions of relative deprivation, so giving more credence to Davies's impressionistic evidence. However the addition of perceptions of illegitimacy on the part of the regime almost doubled the amount of statistical explanation. Thus one cannot subordinate or rule out the effect of ideational variables, as Davies tried to do with respect to the Brinton thesis.

War and Revolution: Wars help to produce revolutions and in turn revolution within one country may lead to wars with neighboring countries:

Revolutions tend to led to more wars: